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In recent years, as technology permitting previously impossible
underwater salvage operations has become available,1 ancient principles
of the laws of salvage and of finds as applied to sunken ships have come
under attack. Those who would limit or preclude the application of
salvage and finds principles and the conduct of salvage operations in the
context of shipwrecks have advocated changes in both the common law
of admiralty and in related statutory law. They have also supported
an international convention on the subject. Academic commentary
favoring heightened preservation praises these developments and promotes
further initiatives to protect the "underwater cultural heritage" from
salvors who are said to be encouraged by traditional salvage and
finds law to pay no heed to historic preservation or the protection of
the environment.
The methods of preservation enacted and suggested thus far, however,
are not the only ones available, and are not the means best suited to the
task. The preservation advocated by commentators is too strict to permit
salvors to perform their useful work. Indeed, it may be so strict as to be
self-defeating, as the very items embodying the "heritage" to be
preserved remain undiscovered, inaccessible, deteriorating, and possibly
subject to theft. Preservationists' attempts to forbid or deter salvors of
sunken property from performing salvage services should be rejected in
* J.D., The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. Member
of the Pennsylvania bar. Assistant Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania.
1. See Timothy T. Stevens, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987: Finding the
Proper Ballastfor the States, 37 VILL. L. REv. 573, 575 n.6 (1992).
favor of a more balanced approach that will provide incentives for raising
sunken maritime property, while ensuring that legitimate historical and
environmental interests are protected.
Evaluation of the validity of the arguments for reform, and the legal
vehicles devised by proponents of change, requires an examination of
the substance of salvage and finds law and the legitimacy of its
underlying rationales in the context of sunken property. Three elements
are needed to make out a valid salvage claim. First, the property
salvaged-including vessels, cargo, and other items2-must be threatened
by a "marine peril."3 Secondly, the salvage services must be "voluntarily
rendered," without the compulsion of any pre-existing duty to salvage
arising by statute or contract.4 Finally, the salvor's efforts to save or
contribute to the saving of the imperiled property must be at least
partially successful. 5
The reward of compensation for salvage services performed upon
maritime property is unparalleled in the law governing the salvage of
2. See Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F.
Supp. 115, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947); see also Provost v. Huber, 594 F.2d 717, 719-20 (8th
Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that the money rescued from the floating body in Broere was
a "proper subject of salvage," but distinguishing the case before it on jurisdictional
grounds). Salvage law has been described as applicable to "anything rescued from
navigable waters, without regard to what it is or how it got there." GRANT GILMORE &
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 538 (2nd. ed. 1975). While no award
was available under traditional maritime salvage principles for the saving of human life
unrelated to the saving of property, courts were willing to indirectly consider lives saved
in calculating an award for the salvage of property, see The Emblem, 8 F. Cas. 611, 612
(D.C.Me. 1840), and an award was available for saving a slave's life even "unconnected
with the saving of property." The Mulhouse, 17 F. Cas. 962, 967 (D.C. Fl. 1859). The
reach of salvage law was extended to allow direct awards for salvage of human lives not
viewed as property, see 46 U.S.C. app. § 729 (2005) (executing into domestic law a
provision of the International Salvage Treaty, art. 11, 12, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658),
but the coverage of the life salvage statute is in some respects limited. See, e.g., St. Paul
Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales Corp., 313 F. Supp. 377, 379 (D. Haw. 1970)
("prerequisite" of life salvage award is claimant's "forego[ing] an opportunity to engage
in the really profitable work of property salvage"); Ta Chi Nav. Corp. v. M.V.
Eurypylus, 583 F. Supp. 1322, 1329 (D. Wash. 1984) (life salvage service must be
"contemporaneous" with traditional salvage service); In re Yamashita-Shinnihon Kison,
305 F. Supp. 796, 800 (D.C. Or. 1969) (reading into the statute, along with other
limitations, a bar on application to cases involving contract salvage); see also
Steven F. Friedell, The Future of Maritime Law in the Federal Courts: A Faculty
Colloquium-Salvage, 31 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 311, 312-13 (2000).
3. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879). Suit must ordinarily be brought within
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to salvage actions. 46 U.S.C. § 730.
4. Id. Courts use the term "pure salvage" to describe situations in which the
salvor and the property owner have not come to any agreement regarding the amount of
compensation to be paid to the salvor. Veverica v. Drill Barge Buccaneer No. Seven,
488 F.2d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1974). Pure salvage is to be distinguished from contract
salvage, in which a contractual duty to salvage exists before the salvage operation is
undertaken. See, e.g., The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186, 192 (1898).
5. The Sabine, 101 U.S. at 384.
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property on land. The most that a rescuer of property found on land can
ordinarily hope to recover for his voluntarily-rendered assistance is
restitution for the value of services performed to accomplish the rescue.6
In many cases, the person who rescues property on land will receive
nothing for his trouble. 7 In contrast, the law of salvage provides "very
ample compensation for those services, (one very much exceeding the
mere risk encountered, and labour employed in effecting them)...
This compensation is not in the nature of restitution or "pay", but instead
assumes the character of a reward, and acts as an inducement in a way
that mere restitution could not.9
This enhanced compensation is offered to encourage potential salvors
to undertake the difficult, time consuming, and dangerous task of
preventing or recovering maritime losses.10 Property and the vessels
carrying it over water are vulnerable to total loss by sinking and in other
ways that property found on land is not." The value of the vessels and
the cargo they transport is likely to be higher than the value of many
losses on land,12 owing to the generally high cost of vessels and the
potentially large amounts of cargo on board. The measures needed to
prevent or recover losses to maritime property, even at a time of great
technological facility and improvement, are likely to be more complex
and expensive than rescue measures undertaken on land. Additionally,
the market for assistance in the water is much more limited than on
land.13 Persons and property confronted with danger on land are more
likely to find assistance than persons and property imperiled in the
6. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 117 (1936) (stating the
general rule providing for restitution recovery; Reporter's Note adds that "[t]he common
law has never recognized as a general principle the rule of the sea, born of necessity,
which permits recovery for salvage services").
7. See Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 6 U.S. 240, 266 (1804); cf id. (reciting elaborate
requirements common law imposes on claimants of restitution in rescue cases on land).
8. Blaireau, 6 U.S. at 266.
9. Id.; see also The Henry Ewbank, 11 F. Cas. 1166, 1170 (Cir. Ct. Mass. 1833)
(Story, J.) (artfully describing the salvage award and its purpose).
10. The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879).
11. See Margate Shipping Co. v. M/V The JA Orgeron, 143 F.3d 976, 984 (5th
Cir. 1998) (noting "peculiar dangers" posed by the sea).
12. Id.
13. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STuD. 83, 87, 100 (1978) (suggesting that owners of imperiled property will be forced by
the market to pay more as the probability of salvage decreases, and recognizing the
likely scarcity of salvors where property is imperiled at sea).
water; fewer people have access to the water, and those that do, and are
equipped to render assistance, have no duty to intervene and are likely to
be going about other business. Because the sea is a vast, empty expanse,
lacking the relatively dense population found on land, the presence of
even a single potential salvor with the requisite skill and equipment
nearby is a godsend. The willingness of potential salvors to aid an
imperiled vessel or property will be greatly diminished if they are
expected either to act as uncompensated Good Samaritans or to receive
mere restitution for the services they perform. Taken together, these
considerations suggest that generous maritime salvage awards are
needed to create appropriate economic incentives to ensure the salvage
of valuable property imperiled at sea. 14
Generous awards to successful salvors advance the interests of both
the property owner and the state by preventing "depredat~ions]" on
hapless owners of property that is lost or may be lost at sea. Absent
the liberal awards contemplated by the law of salvage, potential salvors
might opt to create their own scheme of incentives in exchange for
assistance in the recovery of the property. Instead of turning to
admiralty courts, salvors might instead use the (perhaps increasingly)
grim situation of imperiled property to extort outrageous sums from
property owners. If the extortionate price approaches or exceeds the
value of the property, owners will become more likely to refuse the
assistance of salvors, 6 leading to a wasteful loss of property. 17 Salvors
who are unable to look forward to a court-ordered award of more than
mere restitution will be unlikely to undertake the costly ventures
required to recover the goods. Thus, generous salvage awards prevent
extortionate practices and the loss and waste of otherwise salvable
property.
Conversion and embezzlement are other likely depredations that
would be worked on property owners with greater frequency if the law
eliminated salvage awards or replaced them with mere restitution. 8
14. Id. at 100; see also Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986-88; Nolan v. A.H.
Basse Rederiaktieselskab, 267 F.2d 584, 591 (3rd Cir. 1959) (stating that "[p]ublic
policy is contravened by scanty awards to salvors").
15. The Barque Island City, 66 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1861).
16. See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 91 (noting high transaction costs in such
a situation).
17. Cf Sea Services of the Keys v. Abandoned 29' Midnight Express Vessel, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 1369, 1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (applying the law of finds, and noting the
existence of "a very simple policy" to ensure that sunken property is "return[ed] to a
socially useful purpose").
18. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1, 14 (1869). A salvor gains only the right to
possession, rather than title, when he recovers property. See The Akaba, 54 F. 197, 200
(4th Cir. 1893). After recovering the property, the salvor must bring a salvage action in
court for the disposition of the property if he and the owner do not make other
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Such misappropriation is a matter of concern where the recovered
property is no longer in the control of the owner or his agents, as when a
vessel and its cargo sink. Faced with such a situation, a potential salvor
who stands to gain a generous salvage award will be less tempted to
simply appropriate the property. 19 In the absence of generous salvage
awards, the gains to be reaped by stealing the sunken property would
likely be greater than the best possible outcome the salvor could obtain
in court. 20 This threat to the owner's rights in the property would result in
inefficient outcomes, including potentially requiring the owner to
increase surveillance of the property in the interim between its loss and
recovery, or risk its surreptitious recovery by others.
A salvor who simply keeps salvaged property permanently is acting
unlawfully, because the salvage of property affords only the right to
temporary possession.21 The salvor also gains a maritime lien on the
saved property.22 Extinguishment of the lien by the owner also extinguishes
the salvor's right to possess the property.23 However, where property is
deemed abandoned, a court presented with a question of a salvor's rights
will hold that the salvor, and not the former owner, has title to the
property. In the case of abandonment, the law of finds applies instead of
the law of salvage.24 Rather than compelling people who abandon
sunken property to pay salvage awards, the law of finds recognizes that
by the time a sunken item is recovered, its owner may have given up his
interest in the property.25 In such a case, title to the property will vest in
arrangements. Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A
salvor's intentional disposition of the property by other means may amount to
conversion. See, e.g., Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 673 (5th
Cir. 2000).
19. The Clarita and the Clara, 90 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1874); see Blaireau, 6 U.S. at 276-77.
20. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 962 (4th Cir. 1999).
21. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 286 F.3d 194, 202
(4th Cir. 2002).
22. Id. at 203.
23. Id.
24. Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, &
Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987); see also Klein v.
Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11 th Cir.
1985) (acknowledging this rule, and also noting two exceptions vesting title in the owner
of land on which abandoned property is found-if the property is embedded in the soil,
or if the landowner has constructive possession of it). The law of finds has other maritime
applications outside the context of abandonment, such as a fisherman gaining title to the
fish he catches, and its application is not limited to the sea. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (applying law of finds to dead fox).
25. Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc., 833 F.2d at 1065.
a finder who takes control of the abandoned property with the intent to
assume ownership of it.
26
Some admiralty courts regard the law of salvage and its underlying
policy choices as better aligned with the needs of maritime activity and
less likely to encourage secretive and competitive behavior.27 By
awarding title to finders, the law of finds unquestionably presents them
with incentives to be the first to reach and to take control of property.2 8
When the finder is forced to leave the found property for a period of
time, the law provides good reason to act quickly to return to the site and
extract the valuables. The finder will likely decline to inform other
potential finders of the location of the property, and may well attempt to
conceal it, because no possessory right flows from the simple discovery
of the property or from efforts to control it.29
While the court's reluctance to find abandonment seems reasonable,3 °
the law of finds nonetheless serves a valuable purpose as a counterpart to
salvage law in the context of sunken property. Its application eliminates
the absurd results that would arise if courts, confronted with the recovery
of property that circumstantial evidence indicates has been abandoned,
felt compelled to apply salvage instead of finds law, and to conclude that
such property is still owned. 1 The potential windfall available in the
event that recovered property is held to have been abandoned constitutes
a powerful incentive for salvors to undertake recovery operations in the
first place.32 Finds law also gives property owners a reason to avoid
26. Moyer v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Andrea Doria, 836 F.
Supp. 1099, 1106 (D.N.J. 1993).
27. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
28. Bemis v. R.M.S. Lusitania, No. 95-2057, 1996 WL 525417, at *2-3 (4th Cir.
Sept. 17, 1996) (unpublished opinion; referenced in table at 99 F.3d 1129).
29. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
30. Id. (noting that salvage law is favored over finds law "because salvage law's
aims, assumptions, and rules are more consonant with the needs of marine activity and
because salvage law encourages less secretive... forms of behavior.").
31. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, believed to be the Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d 330, 336-37 (5th Cir.
1978) (case involving long-sunken wreck, noting existence of some authority for refusing to
apply finds law in the maritime context, but nevertheless applying it because "[d]isposition of
a wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for centuries as though its owner
were still in existence stretches a fiction to absurd lengths."). However, the judicial
preference for salvage law is strong enough to produce language in some opinions
suggesting that courts should sometimes refuse to apply finds law to abandoned property.
Treasure Salvors, 640 F.2d at 567 (stating general rule that "salvage of a vessel or goods
at sea, even when the goods have been abandoned, does not divest the original owner of
title or grant ownership rights to the salvor," but "except[ing] extraordinary cases where
the property has been lost or abandoned for a very long period," and applying the
exception). But see Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356.
32. See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 105. Cf Hener, 525 F. Sumi. at 356
(noting a "would-be finder's longing to acquire is exacerbated by the prospect of being
found to have failed to establish title.").
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simply hiding behind legal fictions and leaving their property lying
unavailable for productive use.33 Thus, application of finds law discourages
owners from leaving valuable property underwater for long periods of
time in a manner that could constitute abandonment.
3 4
Those opposed to the application of salvage and finds law in the
context of sunken property base their criticisms on concerns for historical
and environmental preservation.35 According to these critics, historical
and environmental preservation has always been inherently important,
but has been disregarded by courts applying the salvage and finds
doctrines. The growing recognition of these values in modern times,
they argue, invites a change in the law.36 These commentators suggest that
traditional salvage and finds law often provides the wrong incentives
to potential salvors of sunken maritime property. 37 Preservationists
have promoted-and courts, legislatures, and states have adopted or
considered-various legal mechanisms aimed at displacing the
incentives created by traditional salvage and finds law. First, courts have
been encouraged by preservationists to apply a modified version of the
traditional law of salvage, incorporating changes that include limiting
the more salvor-friendly law of finds to the most exceptional cases.
Though the law has long encouraged salvors to recover sunken maritime
property,38 the Antiquities Act and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act
have been employed to carve out exceptions to this principle by limiting
salvage activity in particular contexts. Finally, the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act and a recent international convention focus directly on
33. E.g., Moyer v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, Known as The Andrea Doria,
836 F. Supp. at 1105-06 (inferring from considerable circumstantial evidence of the
shipowner's inaction that it had abandoned this well-known sunken ship).
34. See Sea Services of the Keys v. Abandoned 29' Midnight Express Vessel, 16
F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1372-73 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (noting that policy underlying law of finds
protects those who "endeavor to return lost or abandoned goods to society" by "actually
retrieving the property and returning it to a socially useful purpose").
35. See generally Anne G. Giesecke, The Abandoned Shipwreck Act through the
Eyes of its Drafter, 30 J. MAR L. & COM. 167 (1999); Richard T. Robol, Legal Protection
for Underwater Cultural Resources: Can We Do Better?, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 303
(1999); Ole Varmer, The Case Against the "Salvage" of the Cultural Heritage, 30 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 279 (1999); See also United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization: Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural
Heritage, Nov. 6, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40 (raising concerns for preservation in preamble).
36. See Sarah Dromgoole, Introduction, in LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER
CULTURAL HERITAGE: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES xvii, xix (Sarah
Dromgoole ed., 1999); Robol, supra note 35.
37. See Varmer, supra note 35, at 301-02.
38. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
the traditional salvage and finds rules with a view toward limiting their
applicability as a general matter.
One strictly judicial method promoted by preservationists makes the
application of finds law to sunken ships highly unlikely. It establishes a
rule requiring express proof of affirmative abandonment, "such as an
owner's express declaration abandoning title," when deciding whether to
apply finds or salvage law (except in cases of ancient shipwrecks), and
then denies the applicability of the exception in cases where someone
appears in court claiming ownership. 39 Thus, the salvor faced with the
burden of proving abandonment 4° must show that the sunken property
was expressly abandoned, and that the prior owner clearly and affirmatively
expressed an intention to abandon the property and relinquish rights in
it.41 Other circumstances besides the presence or absence of such an
affirmative expression, although potentially relevant to the issue of
abandonment, will be ignored unless the exception for ancient shipwrecks
applies.42 Also, in courts adopting the approach favored by preservationists,
a salvor's attempt to prove abandonment can be thwarted by the mere
appearance of a putative owner, whose presence as a party to the suit
will automatically result in the application of the law of salvage instead
of the law of finds.43 Only the slimmest possibility remains that the law
of finds will be applied, because courts adopting this approach generally
require that salvors show "strong and convincing" evidence of abandonment."
The infrequency with which owners intending to abandon property are
likely to see the need to declare their intent to the world, and the relative
antiquity of much sunken property, make it likely that the required
evidence of abandonment will be sparse. Thus, where the preservationists'
approach to abandonment is applied, it is unlikely that salvors will be
treated as finders of property.
Courts unwisely impair potential salvors' willingness to recover
property when they limit the concept of abandonment of sunken
maritime property to situations in which the former owner expressly
affirms abandonment. While courts apply salvage law in the absence of a
finding of abandonment, the generous reward to which salvors are
entitled will rarely approach the value of the property recovered.45 Salvors'
39. Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 461-62
(4th Cir. 1992).
40. See Zych v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, believed to be The
SB Lady Elgin, 755 F. Supp. 213, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
41. Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d at 461-62.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. The SB Lady Elgin, 755 F. Supp. at 214.
45. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 563. The treatise notes that awards are
likely to be less than the "moiety" of one half of the value of the salvaged property
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motivation to recover sunken property will decrease as the opportunity
for profit diminishes. Much sunken maritime property may be so situated
that salvors' willingness to risk the expense of an attempt to retrieve it
will be contingent on the existence of a legal means to obtain more than
a salvage award is likely ever to afford them.4 6 Also, where the mere
presence of the former owner as a party in the suit is held automatically
to require the application of salvage law, salvors will be further discouraged
by the possibility that a former owner or purported successor in interest
to such an owner will find it convenient, upon hearing of property's
recovery, to intervene in a suit deciding its disposition. In situations
where the difficulty or cost of recovering sunken property is likely to
exceed the salvage award, the practical effect of foreclosing application
of the law of finds, thereby denying salvors title, will be the cessation of
efforts to recover such property. The property will thus remain owned
but unavailable for economically productive use, even though its owners
may well have intended to abandon it to the sea and to leave it to
potential salvors.
A rule requiring express abandonment would be justified if all
intentional acts of abandonment were accompanied by express declarations
to that effect, but such is not the case. Because abandonment is rarely
accompanied by such declarations, a rule requiring courts to find express
abandonment may well render the law of finds inapplicable without
allowing for ascertainment of the owner's actual intentions as to the
property.4 8  Thus, under an express abandonment rule, protecting the
former owner's interests will frequently be a pointless exercise, because
the owner's intention may have been to abandon the property even
awarded to salvors under a traditional but obsolete rule. Id. While some courts may still
take the moiety concept into consideration when determining an award, see, e.g., Tracor
Marine Inc. v. The MV Margoth, 403 F. Supp. 392, 394-95 (D.C.Z. 1975), even one
half of the value of the salvaged property may not be enough to induce salvors to act
depending on the situation of the imperiled property.
46. Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986. It is possible, however, for a salvage
award to be as large as the whole value of the property. See Platoro, Ltd. v. Unidentified
Remains of a Vessel, Her Cargo, Apparel, Tackle, and Furniture, 695 F.2d 893, 904 (5th
Cir. 1983).
47. Id.
48. See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. The Shipwrecked Vessel, known as The
Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d 491, 499-500 (6th Cir. 1999) (indicating that results
seemingly not in conformity with the facts are likely where a rule of express
abandonment is employed, and noting that judicial opinions purporting to follow this
rule sometimes cannot consistently maintain the fiction even throughout the whole of the
opinion).
though he never openly declared it in a manner sufficient to satisfy the
rule.4 9 The express abandonment rule may therefore bring about the
absurd result of protecting only illusory interests of former owners.5
The interest of potential salvors in gaining title to the found property
stands in stark contrast to the lack of interest of the former owner. In the
case of a considerable amount of sunken maritime property, title to the
property may have to be available before salvage attempts become
worthwhile from an economic standpoint. If salvors are unwilling to
retrieve valuable property because of rules denying them the ability to
take title to it, the effect of the law would be to ensure that the sunken
property remains economically unproductive. This is just the result
desired by preservationists, who view the historical value of a small
number of shipwrecks and the protection of the underwater environment
from damage that may result from careless removal of lost property from
the bottom as adequate justification for imposing rules that will prevent
the retrieval of a considerable amount of property.5'
Owners' property rights ought not to be trifled with, but owners'
interests receive adequate protection in courts that allow for proof of
abandonment of sunken property by inference.52 In such courts, salvors
hoping to be treated as finders must show, clearly and convincingly, that
the owner's abandonment of the property is inferable from the
circumstances. 3 The evidentiary burden that a rule allowing inferential
abandonment places on the salvor is considerable, but it serves as less of
a deterrent to attempts at recovery than an express abandonment
49. The express declaration of abandonment demanded by some courts in the
salvage cases far exceeds the showing needed to establish the abandonment of property
in other contexts, where abandonment may occur without express declarations and even
without affirmative acts. See, e.g., J.W.S. Delavau, Inc. v. Eastern Am. Transport and
Warehousing, Inc., 810 A.2d 672, 684-85 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (raising the issue of
abandonment of goods in a warehouse, stating that "[a]bandonment involves an intention
to abandon, together with an act or omission to act by which such intention is apparently
carried into effect," and permitting circumstantial proof). Similarly, the refusal of some
courts to apply finds law when a former owner appears is inconsistent with the usual rule
that "[a]bandonment of property divests the owner of his ownership, so as to bar him
from further claim to it, [e]xcept that he, like anyone else, may appropriate it once it is
abandoned if it has not already been appropriated by someone else." Right Reason
Publications v. Silva, 691 N.E.2d 1347, 1351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). See also Nippon Shosen
Kaisha, K.K. v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 55, 59 (N.D. Ca. 1964) ("[o]nce abandoned
property has been appropriated by another, the former owner who relinquished such
property cannot reclaim it.").
50. See The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d at 337.
51. See, e.g., Ole Varmer & Caroline M. Blanco, United States of America, in
LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL HERITAGE: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 205-21 (Sarah Dromgoole, ed., 1999).
52. See, e.g., The SB Lady Elgin, 755 F. Supp. at 214-16 (applying circumstantial
evidence test, but concluding that the property was not abandoned).
53. Id. at214.
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standard. The blanket imposition of salvage law to the exclusion of
finds law by some courts in any action to which the most recent owner
of the property becomes a party54 renders evidence on the question of
abandonment irrelevant, and is not justified by any valid public policy.
Instead, it hampers the operation of a useful mechanism of incentives
designed to retrieve property that would otherwise be lost to the sea.55 If
salvors anticipate insufficient court awards, they are more likely to
conceal their work and avoid the judicial process altogether. Eliminating
restrictions on finds law would allow courts to consider a variety of
relevant facts to decide whether an inference of abandonment should
arise.56 As to asserted interests in historical and environmental preservation,
it seems clear that application of other rules can achieve those goals
without impeding salvage activity.57
Some of those attempting to effect a change in judicially-crafted rules
to forestall application of the law of finds and of salvage have argued
that an element essential for a salvage claim is lacking in the case of
sunken maritime property.58 Their contention is that once property is
lying on the bottom, the only possible peril it faces is its deterioration in
the water. 59 This danger, they say, is not so great, because the pace of
deterioration once an item has sat on the bottom for a time is actually
quite slow, and is probably no greater than the perils which could befall
it on land.60 The adoption of such a rule would render "pure" salvage
awards--those for salvage not performed pursuant to contract-unavailable
for recoveries of sunken property.
Courts addressing this argument have stated that adopting it would
break with precedent, which holds sunken maritime property to be
imperiled for salvage purposes. 61 This precedent is best understood as
54. Columbus-Am. Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 464-65 (suggesting that
abandonment will not be found where "previous owner appear[s]").
55. Cf Blaireau, 6 U.S. at 267 (noting, in the context of a discussion of salvage
law, that "the general interests of society require that the most powerful inducements
should be held forth to men[] to save... property about to perish at sea").
56. See The Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d at 499-500 (noting that a "combination
of several facts, proved clearly and convincingly," will give rise to an inference of
abandonment); see also Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. at 1105 (identifying more specific
factors to which courts look in deciding whether to infer abandonment).
57. See infra at 34-39.
58. See Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 614 F.2d 1051, 1055
(5th Cir. 1980) (argument made as to ship sunk more than 400 years earlier).
59. Id.; see also Varmer, supra note 35, at 280-81.
60. Varmer, supra note 35, at 280-81.
61. See, e.g., The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2dat 337.
suggesting that the peril with which salvage law is concerned is not
merely the danger of damage to the property, but also the danger of harm
to the owner's interest in that property.62 The validity of this argument
can be understood by considering the example of precious metals lost at
sea. Just like precious metals found on land, their value may appreciate
while they rest on the bottom. Those wishing to limit salvage law's
applicability would argue that this situation does not call for the
application of salvage law because the owner's property faces no peril,
and is actually increasing in market value. This understanding ignores
the diminution in the sunken items' value to their owner who, as a
practical matter, cannot dispose of his interest in them at their market
value because he cannot deliver possession of them to a buyer. The
market price of property in the possession of its owner is not a useful
measure of the value of sunken property that cannot be brought to
market. That sunken property remains out of the owner's control should
thus be a sufficient reason to treat it as imperiled, because the owner's
lack of possession of the property makes it less valuable to him.63
Other reasons exist for continuing to recognize sunken property as
imperiled. Although sunken property may not deteriorate rapidly in the
water, it does actually deteriorate. 64 Moreover, the lack of possession of
property by the owner or his agent exposes the property to loss at the
hands of thieves,65 whose "depredat[ions]" are one reason why salvage
law offers incentives to salvors to bring property before the court to
permit its disposition.66 On these grounds, courts have agreed that danger to
sunken property can reasonably be apprehended, and therefore found it
to be imperiled.67
Failure to recognize sunken property as imperiled would limit awards
to persons who recover it to the remedies available under the law of
finds-which, as noted above, have themselves become more difficult to
62. See Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 56 F.3d 556, 572-73
(4th Cir. 1995).
63. Id. (noting, in the case of millions of dollars worth of sunken gold, that
although the gold itself was not damaged by being underwater, the gold was in the
"ultimate peril" because any value society attributed to it was dependent on its
"continued utility as property"). See also Thompson v. One Anchor and Two Anchor
Chains, 221 F. 770, 773 (W.D. Wis. 1915) (Propertv held to be imperiled for purposes of
salvane claim because it was "actually lost": "the 'marine peril' certainly was not diminished
or extinguished by the fact they were actually lost").
64. See International Aircraft Recovery L.L.C. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and
Abandoned Aircraft, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (rev'd on other grounds
at 218 F.3d 1255 (1 1th Cir. 2000)) (noting the corrosion caused by presence of sunken
aircraft in saltwater).
65. Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
549 F. Supp. 540, 557 (S.D. Fl. 1982) (mentioning this risk).
66. See, e.g., The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
67. E.g., Cobb Coin, 549 F. Supp. at 557.
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obtain in some courts. Legitimate attempts at salvage of most sunken
property might well cease entirely.6 8 Eliminating salvage relief would
encourage individuals to convert sunken property by retrieving and
keeping it.69 Owners of the sunken property would thus endure the harm
wrought by this attempt to change the rule, because their property would
be less likely to be retrieved and returned, and more likely to be stolen.
It is true that the elimination of pure salvage in cases of sunken property
does not foreclose all possible salvage, because of the continued
availability of contract salvage to the owner as a means of retrieving his
property. While contract salvage may provide a useful alternative where
the probability of successful recovery of the property is high and the
value of the work to be performed can be fairly readily ascertained, in
instances of salvage of sunken items, such conditions will not often
prevail. As the probability of recovery and the parties' certainty as to
the value of the salvage services required decreases, parties will find it
more difficult to agree to a salvage contract. 70 The rules of pure salvage
offer an important detour around what may sometimes appear to be
intractable obstacles to bargaining in the salvage context,71 which are
probably common in the field of sunken salvage, where costs may be
high and not readily ascertainable at the outset of a salvage operation.
Contract salvage can function only where the parties can agree to terms,
and thus cannot adequately substitute for all awards of pure salvage,72
which would be rendered unavailable in cases of sunken property by a
rule that such property is not imperiled.
Those seeking to deny salvors resort to salvage and finds law have
also sought to advance their cause by resort to a few preservation statutes of
a general character that predate efforts to pass statutes targeting salvage
and finds law in particular. The oldest of these is the Antiquities Act of
68. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986 (suggesting that economic reality
would prevent such a salvage operation).
69. The very "depredat[ions]" sought to be prevented by courts would occur. See,
e.g., The Barque Island City, 66 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1861).
70. Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 100-05 (describing how the operation of
salvage law helps overcome high transaction costs that impede contractual salvage
arrangements).
71. Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986-87 (noting that "most meetings of salvor
and salvee cannot be resolved" through "freely negotiated contract," and adopting
analysis of economic underpinnings of salvage law found in Landes & Posner, supra
note 13).
72. Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 100-05.
1906. 73 The Act criminalizes the appropriation, excavation, injury, or
destruction of "any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any
object of antiquity, situated on lands owned or controlled by the
government of the United States," unless permission to engage in such
activity has been obtained from the government.74 The broad language
of the Act is applicable to "lands owned or controlled by the government
of the United States," even when those lands are located underwater.75
The utility of the Antiquities Act for preservationists of sunken
property was considerably diminished by the Fifth Circuit's reading of
the Act in conjunction with the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.76
The court construed the Continental Shelf Act as extending U.S. jurisdiction
over the outer continental shelf for purposes of controlling and
exploiting the natural resources of the shelf, but not for other purposes.77
The limited assertion of jurisdiction over natural resources-and implicitly,
the non-assertion of jurisdiction over non-natural resources like sunken
property-means that the submerged shelf lands are not "owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States"'78 unless the property
73. 16 U.S.C. §431 etseq. (2000).
74. Id. § 433.
75. See The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d at 337-38 (implying that it is
applicable at least in the territorial sea of the United States).
76. See id. at 338-40 (discussing reach of Antiquities Act in connection with Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, and concluding that the Antiquities Act did not protect a
shipwreck located on the outer continental shelf); 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. (2000) (the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act). This Act defines the extent to which the United
States asserts jurisdiction over the Outer Continental Shelf. See 43 U.S.C. § 1333
(United States "laws and jurisdiction" extend to the "subsoil and seabed of the outer
continental shelf').
77. The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d at 339-40. The court noted
Congress's identification of a "national.. .interest" in exploiting mineral wealth under the
ocean. Id. at 337. It also looked to the Act's limited primary purpose of resolving
competing claims to ownership of offshore natural resources. Id. at 339. Finally, it
noted that a limited reading of the Act was consistent with the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, to which the U.S. was a party, and which had superseded inconsistent
provisions of the Continental Shelf Act. Id. at 339-40. See also Convention on the
Continental Shelf. ovenedfor signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, art. 2 (entered into
force June 10, 1964) (recognizing sovereign rights of states over the "continental
shelf... for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources"). The
court noted that the Convention's drafters had "clearly understood that the [sovereign]
rights" being defined by the treaty "do not cover objects such as wrecked ships and their
cargoes ... lying on the seabed or covered by the sand of the subsoil." The Nuestra
Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d at 340 (citing Comments of International Law Commission
on the Convention, 11 U.S. G.A.O.R., Supp. 9 at 42, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)). The
conclusion drawn by the Fifth Circuit was consistent with an earlier decision of that
court. See Guess v. Read, 290 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1961) (Continental Shelf Act was
"enacted for the purpose, primarily, of asserting ownership of and jurisdiction over the
minerals in and under the continental shelf').
78. The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978).
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on the shelf is a natural resource. Thus, sunken property found on the
submerged shelf lands is not protected by the Antiquities Act.
The size of the area excluded from the coverage of the Antiquities Act
by this ruling is considerable. This exclusion does not mean, however,
that the Antiquities Act is of no consequence to salvors. In those parts
of the territorial seabed over which the federal government either asserts
ownership or exercises control, the Antiquities Act forbids interference
with historically valuable property without a permit.79  Salvors who
discover sunken property cannot be sure at the time of the discovery
whether it is of a historic nature for purposes of the Act.80 Uncertainty
surrounding the exact characteristics of the items to be protected--"objects,"
"ruins," and "monuments"-leaves the statute's applicability and the
permit process subject to abuse by officials to whom the vague language
of the statute imparts considerable discretion. Salvors may also be
unsure whether the submerged lands on which they find property are
included in the area covered by the Act.
79. Id at 337-38.
80. The uncertainty surrounding the application of the statute may take on a
constitutional dimension. The Ninth Circuit has held the Antiquities Act to violate the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th
Cir. 1974), the subject matter of which occurred on land, the court reversed the
conviction under the Act of a thief of ritual masks from a tribal reservation. The
government's evidence included the testimony that the recent vintage of the masks,
which were agreed to have been between two and three years old, did not prevent them
from having the historical significance required for protection under the Act because of
their association with tribal ceremonies which had a long history. Id. at 114. The Court
reversed the conviction, because the statute, which creates a criminal sanctioh, was
unconstitutionally vague as applied to that case, as it failed to give sufficient notice to the
public of what activities it criminalized. Id. at 115. The Diaz holding has not led other
circuits to strike down the Act as applied to facts more clearly demonstrating the
historical significance of the artifacts. See United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 941
(10th Cir. 1979) (discussing artifacts between eight and nine hundred years old).
However, Congress was prompted to enact more specific legislation in the form of the
Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979. 16 U.S.C. § 470(aa)-(mm). This
more recent law operates in the same manner as the Antiquities Act, stating that "[n]o
person may excavate, remove, damage, or otherwise alter or deface" or attempt to do any
of these things without a permit authorizing them to do so. 16 U.S.C. § 470(ee)(a). It
aims to cure the constitutional defect found in the Antiquities Act by the Ninth Circuit by
limiting its application to archaeological resources more than 100 years old. Its
geographical scope expressly excludes the outer continental shelf, 16 U.S.C. § 470
(bb)(3)(B). It also provides for stiffer criminal penalties, 16 U.S.C. § 470(ee)(d), and
adds to these the possibility of civil penalties. 16 U.S.C. § 470(ff). Perhaps owing to its
limited applicability, it has yet to be applied in a reported decision in a case of maritime
salvage.
Potential salvors who intend to comply with the law by proceeding
through the courts for a determination as to the disposition of the property81
must either inquire in advance as to whether a permit is needed or
proceed as though it is not, risking a finding of criminal liability.
82
Cautious salvors will incur costs associated with ascertaining the Act's
applicability and seeking a permit where the Act applies, thereby
increasing the amount of resources required to conduct salvage
operations. 83 If salvors inquire about a permit, they risk a determination
that the statute does apply. The government is under no obligation to
grant a permit, 84 so the salvors may well be out of luck. Alternatively,
salvors may try their luck by engaging in one of the "depredat[ions]"
sought to be avoided by salvage law: the covert removal and retention of
the recovered property without any attempt on the part of the salvor to
determine the property's status in court.
The application of this old Act in the maritime context is misguided,
as is apparent from an evaluation of the legislation's purpose to preserve
history, which is treated as a limited resource.86 The Antiquities Act was
originally enacted in response to the vandalism of ancient ruins in the
Southwest, and similar damage that had occurred over the years at
locations like Mount Vernon.87 Such historical sites possess a common
characteristic not shared by sites that recent commentators regard as
comprising the "underwater cultural heritage": removal of artifacts at
the sites would reduce the public's opportunity for exposure to their
historical and cultural significance. For example, Mount Vernon's many
visitors would not leave Washington's residence with the same
appreciation of its historical significance if prior visitors had removed
most of the contents of the home and adjacent buildings.
81. Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 358.
82. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2000).
83. Increasing the resources required itself decreases the likelihood that salvage
operations will take place. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986; Landes & Posner,
supra note 13, at 100-05 (emphasizing that salvage law is meant to overcome already-
high transaction costs-without considering the addition of greater costs due to
legislation).
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 432 (2000).
85. See Blaireau, 6 U.S. at 266 (suggesting the potential for "embezzlement" by
salvors).
86. Patty Gerstenblith, Protection of Cultural Heritage Found on Private Land, 13
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 65, 69 (2000); see also M. Catherine Vernon, Common Cultural
Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
435, 436 (1994).
87. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1457, at 17-18 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6378, 6380 (noting that the Antiquities Act was a response to damage wrought at sites in
the Casa Grande Mountains in Arizona, and discussing earlier private efforts to save
Mount Vernon from damage); Gerstenblith, supra note 86, at 71-72.
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By contrast, submerged shipwrecks are not accessible to anyone
without the proper equipment, training, and physical capabilities.8 8
When items are removed from the seabed, the general public likely has
no less access to the artifacts than it had before their removal. Indeed, if
historically significant items that are recovered are put on display in a
museum, then the "supply" of history available to the public as "consumers"
would increase rather than decrease as a result of the salvors' recovery
of the property and its subsequent disposition. The Act's deterrent effect
on salvors and their exploration means that sunken property which has a
known location will remain inaccessible and that much sunken property
will remain undiscovered.89
Another statute of a fairly general character, the National Marine
Sanctuaries Act,90 vests authority in the Secretary of Commerce to
"designate any discrete area of the marine environment as a national
marine sanctuary. ."9 Designation by the Secretary is discretionary,
based on his evaluation of a given area in terms of a list of "standards"
provided by Congress. The evaluation must be accompanied by
"consideration" of a separate list of "factors" and "consultation" with
specified governmental bodies and "other interested persons." 92 Unlike
the Antiquities Act as construed by the Fifth Circuit, the Sanctuaries Act
applies even to areas extending as far as 200 miles offshore.93 To be
88. See Christopher R. Bryant, The Archaeological Duty of Care: The Legal,
Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 65 ALB. L.
REV. 97, 110 n.93 (2001) (noting that costs can be "prohibitive"). The impediment
underlying salvors lack of access to these necessaries is the need for money-often a
substantial amount of it-to gain access to underwater sites. Id. at 137 n.234 (noting the
difficulty of reaching preserved underwater sites). The costly nature of salvage activity
imposes risks on salvors, whose success is often uncertain and whose very enterprise is a
speculative one. The Lamington, 86 F. 675, 678 (2nd C.C.A. 1898) (the "salving
enterprise... is, after all, a speculation, in which desert and reward will not always
balance").
89. See Jeffrey T. Scrimo, Raising the Dead: Improving the Recovery and
Management of Historic Shipwrecks, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 271, 278-79 (2000)
(suggesting the inability of archaeologists to pick up the slack where salvors are legally
inhibited).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1431 etseq. (2000).
91. Id. § 1433.
92. Id.
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 1433 (sanctuaries may be established in "any discrete area of
the marine environment"); 16 U.S.C. § 1437(k) (giving statutory penalties same potential
scope); See also 16 U.S.C. § 1432(3) (defining the "marine environment" to include "those
areas of coastal and ocean waters, the Great Lakes, and submerged lands over which the
United States exercises jurisdiction, including the exclusive economic zone, consistent
with international law").
designated a sanctuary, an area must be found by the Secretary to possess
"special national significance due to-(A) its conservation, recreational,
ecological, historical, scientific, cultural, archaeological, educational, or
esthetic qualities; (B) the communities of living marine resources it
harbors; or (C) its resource or human-use values.
' '94
Regardless of the characteristics of an area cited by the Secretary as
reasons for establishing a sanctuary, the impact on potential salvors of
sunken property in the sanctuary will be great. The Act establishes civil
penalties and a forfeiture remedy and permits injunctive relief 95 against
persons who "destroy, cause the loss of, or injure any sanctuary resource
managed under law or regulations for that sanctuary," or who possess or
traffic in "any sanctuary resource taken in violation of this section.,
96
One may "injure" a sanctuary resource under the law by merely "chang[ing]
adversely, either in the short or long term, a chemical, biological, or
physical attribute of, or the viability of," the resource. 9 7 "Sanctuary resources"
include "any living or non-living resource.. .that contributes to the
conservation, recreational, ecological, historical, research, educational, or
aesthetic value of the Sanctuary., 98 These include "submerged features"
and "historical resources." 99 It seems unlikely that any salvage effort
could be undertaken in a Sanctuary without "adversely affecting" one of
its protected attributes and thereby triggering potentially substantial
penalties. 00 It is possible to obtain a permit to engage in salvage, but
regulations suggest that this requires considerable effort, and the government
is under no obligation to grant one. 10 Further restrictions may be
applied in the Secretary's discretion to particular Sanctuaries, potentially
placing further limitations on salvage activity. 1
02
Reported decisions applying the National Marine Sanctuaries Act to
the activities of salvors are infrequent, but make clear the impact of an
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1433(a)(2). Other requirements also apply. See id. § 1433(a).
95. See id. § 1437(d) (providing for civil penalties); § 1437(e) (providing for
forfeiture of items retrieved and vessels used); § 14370) (providing for injunctive relief
when sought by the Attorney General at the request of the Secretary of Commerce). See
also 16 U.S.C. § 1437 (providing for criminal penalties for interference with the
enforcement of the Sanctuaries Act within the meaning of 16 U.S.C. § 1436(3)).
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1436 (2000).
97. 15 C.F.R. § 922.3 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Civil penalties can be as high as $100,000 per violation, with violations
committed over time being treated as giving rise to one violation a day. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1437(d).
101. 15 C.F.R § 922.48 (describing the grant of a permit as a matter of "discretion").
102. E.g. id. § 922.163(a)(9) (2005) (restricts salvage activity in Florida Keys
National Marine Sanctuary); id. § 922.91(a)(7) (restricts salvage activity in Gray's Reef
National Marine Sanctuary); id. § 922.132(a)(3),(4) (restricts salvage activity, as well as
prohibits "altering the seabed," in Monterey Bay National Maritime Sanctuary).
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area's Sanctuary status and related regulations on the ability to salvage
property within the area. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the Act to
affirm the issuance of a preliminary injunction forbidding salvors from
employing a particular method of salvage to recover artifacts within the
Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary, after the government alleged that
environmental harms had been caused.10 3 The salvors' activities were
alleged to have adversely affected the Sanctuary's seagrass and its coral
reef ecosystem. 104 Later, the district court awarded a permanent injunction
forbidding any salvage without an authorizing permit. 10 5 In addition, the
salvors were penalized for the damage they caused and for "response
costs" incurred by the government as a result of their activities.
0 6
The salvors employed practices that were probably unnecessarily
harmful to the environment,'0 7 so their case did not test the extent to
which a court would be willing to apply the "change[d] adversely" test
for injury caused by salvors to sanctuary resources.108 While the courts
have not had occasion to suggest whether and to what extent an adverse
change caused to sanctuary resources could be too small to be treated
as an "injury," the statute suggests that any change that cannot be
characterized as "negligible" would be sufficient.'0 9 In any event, the
meaning of these decisions for all salvors is apparent. The courts
confirmed that the National Marine Sanctuaries Act could prevent all
unauthorized salvage in Sanctuaries and impose penalties on salvors.
The resulting disincentive to salvors' recovery of sunken property
from Sanctuaries does not guarantee better protection for resources
targeted by the Act, and leaves society without the benefits of salvage
that have traditionally made it a subject of judicial encouragement.
When faced with the designation of large areas as Sanctuaries, salvors,
who are likely to become more numerous and better equipped as technology
improves and becomes more generally available, are deprived in the
sanctuary areas of any incentive to bring their recoveries before a court
103. United States v. Fisher, 22 F.3d 262, 270 (1 1th Cir. 1994). The court outlined
the procedure for enforcement of the Act's provisions by injunction, and found that the
determination by the Secretary and his request to the Attorney General to bring an
enforcement action did not require further Congressional involvement. Id at 269.
104. Id. at 265.
105. United States v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp 1193, 1202 (S.D.Fla. 1997).
106. Id. at 1200-01.
107. See id. at 1196-98 (describing the methods used by these salvors, which
caused more than 100 holes to be made in the sea floor).
108. 15 C.F.R. § 922.3 (2005).
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 1443(a)(3)(C) (2000) (defense allowed where harm is "negligible").
for disposition. While some salvors may relocate to areas outside
sanctuaries that are more favorable for salvage, many may be faced with
the choice of ceasing their operations entirely or continuing them
covertly and illegally. Moreover, sunken property well-suited to salvage
may be located in the Sanctuaries," 0 making salvors less willing to leave
them. The sorts of activities in which salvors might engage are indicated
by the facts of the Craft case, which was tried before an administrative
law judge."'1 The divers in that case traveled by boat to an area replete
with sunken property, some of which was evidently worthy of the
attention of salvors, and dove to remove it. 11  They were aware that
diving was illegal because the area was within the Channel Island
National Marine Sanctuary. Because of the illegality, the salvors tried to
avoid being discovered by taking precautionary measures," 3 but these
were unsuccessful, and they were assessed penalties. 1
4
The rare cases in which salvors are caught in a protected area and
fined should not be taken to suggest that the Act has served as an
effective deterrent to this activity, or that it is well designed for the
purpose. The brazenness of the protagonists' activities in Craft suggests
that craftier lawbreakers may be doing similar deeds in Sanctuaries
without facing any punishment, and recovering property that they never
bring before a court. Because they are unable to look to a judicial award
and are unlikely to be caught, salvors in Sanctuaries may covertly
dispose of recovered property without judicial involvement." 5 The
quality of salvage efforts may be affected as well. When salvors are
unconcerned about statutory penalties, they will be less6prone to engage
in hasty, careless salvage efforts to recover property. Attempting to
110. See, e.g., Christopher L. Meazell, Being and Embeddedness: The Abandoned
Shipwreck Act's Historical Proxy is All at Sea, 34 GA. L. REV. 1743, 1761-61 (2000)
(noting optimal conditions for salvage of sunken property in Florida Keys National
Marine Sanctuary, specifically describing underwater reefs which are objects of
preservation but also the site of many shipwrecks); see also In the Matter of Craft, 6
O.R.W. 150, 151 n.2 (1990) (describing site consisting of seven ships wrecked long ago
on a reef in what is now Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary).
111. Craft, 6 O.R.W. at 180-82 (case in which divers characterized by judge as
"looters" engaged in "wreck raiding" that constituted "predatory activity;" opinion
describes "a deliberate and successful effort to plunder . .. closed areas of [a] Marine
Sanctuary," led by a dive master whose misconduct was "gross" and "mocked the law").
112. Id. at 151-52.
113. Id. at 152. The failure of the divers' scheme and their ultimate punishment
was due in part to an undercover operation staged by park rangers. Id. at 150-52.
114. Id. at 152-53, 182. At the hearing, the divers' counsel advanced the argument
that the site at which the events took place was not historically or archaeologically
significant, which argument was emphatically rejected by the judge. Id. at 181.
115. Id. at 182 (noting that the fines imposed under the Act are likely not enough to
prevent further illegal recovery operations).
116. The divers in Craft received warnings as to the possibility that they would
have to leave the site quickly to avoid detection by authorities, and in the event of such
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keep sunken property from salvors by banning their activities if
undertaken without permission is thus likely to result in theft and harm
to the very property and surrounding environment that are intended to be
preserved.
It is also plain that the long-acknowledged benefits of giving salvors
incentives to perform their useful work cannot be realized in Sanctuaries.
The benefits of retrieving property that accrue to property owners (in the
nature of the recovery of their property), salvors (in the nature of the
receipt of the award they are due), and to society as a whole (in the
nature of the return of sunken items to economically productive uses)
cannot be realized in Sanctuaries, as even salvors of non-historic
property may fear that they will be held to have "change[d] adversely"
some sanctuary resource, like seagrass or possibly even micro-organisms
near the salvage site.1"7 Property is thus likely to go to waste, and
owners are likely to remain divested of possession of their property by
the water. Salvors may decide to operate illegally, but when they do,
owners of the salvaged property are not likely to see it returned because
courts punish salvors rather than rewarding their efforts.
The Act's impairment of salvors' work may actually thwart historical
preservation, one of the very reasons asserted for the creation of sanctuaries.
The raising of the turret of the U.S.S. Monitor in 2002 was undertaken at
the behest of the Monitor National Maritime Sanctuary, which was first
established in 1975.118 Requests to dive for purposes of observing and
photographing the Monitor in the early 1990s were denied, leaving the
divers to go through an administrative appeals process to gain access for
even limited purposes.1 19 However, it was later discovered that the so-
called preservation of the Monitor on the sea floor had left it in an
increasingly deteriorated condition.1 20 The salvage of the Monitor a decade
detection, they were alerted by an "underwater alarm system" to quickly get back on
board. Id. at 157-58. Such measures can only make for hasty, destructive removal of
property, but they are likely to be undertaken by salvors compelled to operate illegally.
117. The Act and its regulations are typically broad enough to restrict the salvage of
even recently-sunken property. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R § 922.102(a)(5)(6) (2005) (forbidding
removal or tampering with and "historical or cultural resource," as well as "[d]isturbing
the benthic community" by "altering the seabed").
118. See National Marine Sanctuaries, Press Release: Monitor's Historic Gun
Turret Closer to Recovery, http://www.sanctuaries.nos.noaa.gov/news/pressreleases/
pressrelease07_08_02.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (describing the operation); see
also 15 C.F.R. § 922.60 (boundary of Sanctuary).
119. See generally Gentile, 6 O.R.W. a (1990); Hess, 6 O.R.W. 720a (1992).
120. See Bad Weather at USS Monitor Dive Site, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
earlier would probably have saved it from some of this damage. For a
variety of reasons, the improvidence of creating Sanctuaries that obstruct
salvors from going about their work should be recognized and corrected
by modifying the law.
Unlike the Antiquities Act and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act,
the Abandoned Shipwreck Act's sole focus is sunken ships, to which the
latter Act limits the applicability of salvage and finds rules.121 Under the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act, the "United States asserts title to any
abandoned shipwreck" if it is "embedded in submerged lands of a State,
embedded in coralline formations protected by a State on submerged
lands of a State, or on submerged lands of a state and is included in or
determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register." 122 The submerged
lands of states referred to include their territorial seas and navigable
waterways.1 23 The U.S. government's freshly-minted title is immediately
transferred under the Act to the state "in or on whose submerged lands
the shipwreck is located.' 24 The impact of this unusual assertion and
transfer of title is hinted at by the Act's statement that the "law of
salvage and the law of finds shall not apply to abandoned shipwrecks" to
which title is asserted. 125
Even without explicitly stating that the law of finds does not apply,
however, the Act forecloses the application of the law of finds to sunken
property to which its title-taking provision applies. Only abandoned
property can ever be subject to the law of finds; 126 the former owner of
such property has divested himself of title to it, and a new owner may
take possession of the property with intent to control it and thus take title
to it. Under the Act, where applicable, the United States asserts title to
the property before anyone else, preventing salvors from recovering the
property and asserting title to it as abandoned and unowned.
1 27
The Act's impact on the law of salvage, at first glance, does not seem
as clear. The Act is applicable only to abandoned vessels, 28 which were
previously treated as subject to the application of the law of finds.
Although, on the right facts, results under the law of salvage can sometimes
2002/08/05/eveningnews/main517590.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2005) (reporting that
the wreck was in "the final stages of deterioration and [was] about to collapse.").
121. See 43 U.S.C. § 2101 (2000) etseq.
122. Id. § 2105(a). The state seeking to show its title to a shipwreck bears the
burden of proving the applicability of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act to a given wreck.
The Captain Lawrence, 177 F.3d at 500.
123. 43 U.S.C. § 2102(f).
124. Id. § 2105(c).
125. Id. § 2106(a).
126. Andrea Doria, 836 F. Supp. at 1105.
127. 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (2000).
128. Id.
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approximate the results produced by application of the law of finds,
salvage law applies to property which has not been abandoned. The
property's abandonment triggers the application of finds law, conversely
preventing the application of salvage law. While it is true that the Act
recites that the law of salvage, like the law of finds, "shall not apply to
abandoned shipwrecks" to which title is asserted, the preexisting
inapplicability of salvage law to abandoned sunken property suggests
that salvage claims are still available when a shipwreck otherwise
meeting the Act's criteria is found not to be abandoned.
129
The Act might appear to leave salvors with adequate incentives to
continue to perform their work, even on sunken property to which the
Act applies. However, the Act's drafter noted a few years after its
enactment that she believed it had contributed to a reduction in the
number of suits for salvage awards brought, and, by implication, to a
reduction in salvage activity itself.'30 Three aspects of the Act deter
salvage operations on shipwrecks within states' territorial seas, in which
a large concentration of salvageable ships are likely to be found. The first
of these deterrents to salvage operations has already been mentioned: the
elimination of the law of finds as a means of obtaining title to the
property. An award as valuable as title to property is the most the salvor
can hope to obtain for his service. With the possibility of this award
greatly reduced, salvors' incentive to work to recover property has
been reduced commensurately.1
3 '
The second aspect of the Act that deters potential salvors from
retrieving sunken property also relates to the elimination of the law of
finds. Generally, the applicability of the Act must be determined judicially,
on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, salvors must make a difficult choice.
They may undertake the salvage operation, gambling that the court will
not decide the Act was applicable and thereby deny them a recovery.
129. THoMAs J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 146-47 & n.71
(4th ed. 2004). The Act "did not affect the meaning of 'abandoned."' The Captain
Lawrence, 177 F.3d at 498. The Act therefore places salvors in the unusual position of
arguing for the application of salvage law instead of finds law, and creates a rare instance
in which they benefit from the rule in some courts that an express declaration is required
for abandonment. See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or
Vessels, Their Apparel, Tackle, Appurtenances and Cargo, 221 F.3d 634, 640-47 (in an
Abandoned Shipwreck Act case, requiring express abandonment).
130. See Giesecke, supra note 35, at 168 (noting reduction in the number of salvage
claims brought before the courts since passage of the Act).
131. See Hener, 525 F. Supp. at 356 (noting the extensive incentives made available
by finds law).
Or, to avoid incurring potentially monstrous losses due to the denial of
an award, 132 potential salvors may avoid performing salvage services on
any sunken property to which the Act could possibly be applied. The
uncertainty faced by salvors who risk the loss of their entire investment
in a salvage effort if courts are unwilling to compensate them may deter
salvors in the territorial sea from attempting salvages at all. Except for
large salvage companies prepared to absorb a financial blow, salvors
may be unable to risk the loss of the resources expended to undertake a
salvage effort. Given the relatively large numbers of sites where shipwrecks
can be found in territorial seas, 13 3 salvors may be hard pressed to simply
ignore the territorial seas as a potential locus for salvage operations.
34
The result of the Act is to increase the probability of financial harm to
salvors, whether they choose to continue salvaging potentially Act-
covered property or not. It thus deters specific acts of salvage within the
relevant geographical areas, and threatens the continued viability of
sunken salvage. "
132. See Edward W. Horan, Organizing, Financing, and Manning a Treasure
Salvage Operation, 30 J. MAR. L & CoM. 235, 235-38 (1999) (noting that much capital is
at stake in such an operation and describing the process of preparation).
133. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(l), at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
365, 365 (House Report of Abandoned Shipwreck Act, indicating that at the time of the
Act's passage there were approximately 50,000 shipwrecks in the navigable waters of
the United States).
134. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(I), at 1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
365, 365 (House Report of Abandoned Shipwreck Act, indicating that at the time of the
Act's passage there were approximately 50,000 shipwrecks in the navigable waters of
the United States). Although salvage technology has allowed for deep sea salvage in a
manner never before possible, see UNESCO Convention (perambulatory language
noting the awareness of the parties "of the availability of advanced technology that
enhances discovery of and access to" underwater sites), it remains the case that wrecks
requiring the least equipment and labor to reach will be those most accessible to salvors.
See Nobuo Shimizu, The Raising of the 'Ehime-Maru' and the Current State of Salvage
Operations from the Deep-Sea, SHIP AND OCEAN NEWSLETTER, No. 20, June 5, 2001,
available at http://www.sof.or.jp/ocean/newsletter_e/pdf/ssp2.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005)
(noting commercial infeasibility of deep sea sunken salvage, and conversely, the
availability of salvage of sunken property in shallower waters); Rob Regan, When Lost
Liners Become Found, 29 TuL. MAR. L.J. 313, 316 (2005) (noting increased traffic at
shallow wreck sites). Many salvors may lack the equipment needed for deep water
operations, which although available, is not cheap. Greg Stemm, et al., Shipwrecks in
the Deep Freeze, MAR. HERITAGE MAG., Apr. 1998, available at http://www.prosea.
org/articles-news/exploration/ Shipwrecks in theDeepFreeze.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2005) (noting "exorbitant costs" of high-tech salvage, placing it "well beyond the reach
of most commercial applications").
135. It is true that a concerned salvor could bring a declaratory judgment action, see
28 U.S.C. § 2201, but use of this procedure increases the initial capital requirements of
salvors, demanding of them the time and money needed for litigation. Moreover,
obtaining the facts a court would need to decide the action might still necessitate going
to the wreck site.
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The third aspect of the Act that deters salvage activity in the territorial
sea is the burden it places on salvors to bear the cost of litigating
jurisdictional issues raised by the interaction of the Act and the Eleventh
Amendment, and the possibility of being deprived of an award should a
court find that sovereign immunity protects the state. The Eleventh
Amendment limits the power of the Federal judiciary to adjudicate
admiralty cases against non-consenting states, 136 and the Supreme Court
held the Eleventh Amendment to be applicable to in rem admiralty
actions in which state officials are in possession of the res that is the
subject of the suit. 137 The Supreme Court relied on republican principles
of accountability and sovereign immunity to hold that, where the
Eleventh Amendment applies, non-consenting states cannot be sued in
state courts. 1
38
This combination of immunities, if applicable, amounts to a significant
obstacle to salvors' claims. Assumption of title to sunken property under
the Act has allowed states to argue that they are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity to suitors claiming salvage awards. Since the
Act's passage, the extent to which states' immunity applies has been
ambiguous. Questions about the colorability and nature of the claim
asserted to the shipwreck by the state and the meaning of the term
"abandoned" in the Act were among the jurisdictional issues adjudicated
repeatedly after the Act's passage. 139 The Supreme Court purported to
clarify these issues when it held that where "vessels... are not in the
possession of a sovereign . . . the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
federal jurisdiction" over in rem claims to the ships. 40 The Court added
that abandonment under the Act has the same meaning as it does in
admiralty law generally. 141 Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain
how much "possession" of a shipwreck a sovereign needed before the
Eleventh Amendment could be invoked, leaving for future resolution
questions about the nature of constructive possession required.142 By
136. Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497-501 (1921) (in personam suit,
although styled as in rem).
137. Florida Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 696-97
(1982); see also California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 503-04, 507 (1998).
138. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) (suit based on Congressional legislation).
139. See Deep Sea Research, 523 U.S. at 498-501 (discussing cases in lower
courts).
140. Id. at 507-08.
141. Id. at 508.
142. Id. at 507-08. Although the court refers to an earlier case requiring "actual"
and not "constructive" possession, The Davis, 77 U.S. 20, 21 (1869), these characterizations
merely pointing to the word's "meaning under admiralty law" to define
the word "abandoned" under the Act, the Court left unresolved the question
of whether abandonment "under admiralty law" must be express or may
be inferred from the circumstances. 143 These and other issues remain
largely unresolved,' 44 confronting salvors with the potential for further
costly jurisdictional and preliminary disputes that must be adjudicated
before a salvage award will even be considered.
45
By limiting salvors' remedies-and possibly their ability to obtain
consideration of their claims on the merits if the Eleventh Amendment's
jurisdictional bar is applied-the Act largely eliminates the incentives
that existed under traditional admiralty law for salvage operations upon
sunken property located within areas covered by the Act. Salvors are
recognizing and reacting in a predictable manner to the salient possibility
that their legitimate work will go unrewarded. 146  Unfortunately, the
least palatable option for salvors operating under the Act is to continue
raising property and bringing it before admiralty courts in the expectation of
receiving an award. Instead, with their prospects limited, salvors may
simply go out of business or find other avocations. Some are pleased by
this result, 47 which leaves thousands of shipwrecks, ranging from the
truly historic to the recent, facing poor prospects of being recovered.
This result comports with preservationists' goals of absolute historical
and environmental preservation, but leaves salvors, owners, and society
unable to realize any of the benefits of salvage activity. Salvors may
also opt to become thieves, employing the improving technologies of
salvage and the impossibility of thorough surveillance of wreck sites to
"depredate" upon the sunken property and dodge the legal obstacles with
which the Act confronts them. 148 This conduct, though risky and reproachable,
may seem rational to salvors confronted with the Act because of their
really amount only to legal conclusions about the status of property. In other words,
courts will still have to adjudicate and may disagree upon the meaning of those terms in
the context of the Eleventh Amendment as applied to in rem admiralty actions.
143. See supra pp. 180-82 (question of whether abandonment must be expressed by
an affirmative act or can be inferred from the circumstances).
144. See generally John Paul Jones, The United States Supreme Court and Treasure
Salvage: Issues Remaining After Brother Jonathan, 30 J. MAR. L. AND COM. 205 (1998).
145. See Horan, supra note 132 (discussing extent of necessary and "protracted"
litigation).
146. See Giesecke, supra note 35, at 168 (stating that the number of salvage claims
in waters covered by the act has dropped dramatically).
147. See id.; Varmer & Blanco, supra note 51 (describing the Act as "alive and
well," and looking forward to a time when it will "ultimately prevail in protecting
shipwrecks").
148. In so depredating, they would do what courts have long warned they would in
the absence of the availability of relief in court. See The Clarita and the Clara, 90 U.S. 1,
17 (1874).
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existing investments in salvage equipment, the improbability of being
caught, and the ever-present allure of sunken valuables.
Preservationists defend the Act as a useful measure to preserve historic
wrecks and avoid environmental damage caused by careless salvors.
149
Preserving history, however, does not require the law to obstruct salvage of
large numbers of wrecks that are not historical, which is the result under
the Act. 150 The purpose of preserving the "underwater cultural heritage" is
also defeated by leaving historical artifacts to deteriorate underwater,
and by keeping the history and culture sought to be preserved out of the
reach of most people who take an interest in it. 151 Prohibiting all activity
that may harm the environment is not recognized as a viable option in
other areas of the law, 152 and is no more sensible in the context of
salvage. Greatly limiting salvors' activities likely is not the best means
of preserving the environment, since salvors perform socially useful
functions, and technological improvements accompanied by related
changes in the law might allow salvage and preservation to coexist.
Thus, the Act's limitations upon salvage and finds law are both costly
and unjustifiable.
Preservationists have tried to advance their agenda in international as
well as American law-making fora, and have achieved some success
with the United Nations Economic and Social Council's approval of the
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.
53
The Convention applies to the "underwater cultural heritage," which it
defines as "all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or
archaeological character which have been partially or totally under
water, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years."' 15 4 Underwater
149. See generally Stevens, supra note 1.
150. See House Report of Abandoned Shipwreck Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-514(I), at
1 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 365, 365 (indicating that only a small
percentage of wrecks covered by the Act were likely to have any historical significance);
see also Meazell, supra note 110, at 1747-49 (2000).
151. See Bryant, supra note 88, at 136 n.244 (describing the prospect of deteriorating,
inaccessible underwater sites being "left to rot" due to legal changes obstructing
salvage).
152. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (2000) (example of law calling for "annual
allowances" of emissions of an air pollutant, rather than absolute prohibition of emissions).
153. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: Convention
on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 6, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 40
[hereinafter "UNESCO Convention"].
154. Id. art. 1.
cultural heritage is therefore not limited to property that is abandoned or
that possesses great cultural or historical significance. 155
For property to which the Convention is applicable, the law of finds
and salvage is inapplicable unless the salvage activity is authorized by
"competent authorities," is in "full conformity" with the Convention and
its Annex, and "ensures that any recovery of the underwater cultural
heritage achieves its maximum protection."' 56 The Convention's Annex
states that the "first option" will be "in situ preservation" of the property,
with any "activities directed at underwater cultural heritage" to be
"authorized in a manner consistent with [its] protection ... for the
purpose of making a significant contribution to protection or knowledge
or enhancement" of it.' 57 The application of the law of salvage or finds
to underwater cultural heritage is authorized only in very limited
circumstances that appear to allow little or no opportunity for these
doctrines' use. 158 The need to sell and disperse the property to pay a
salvage award and the vesting of title in a finder would likely be
deemed "fundamentally incompatible" with the objectives of the
Convention.' 59 The "competent authorities" differ depending upon location,
but plans to engage in activities directed at the underwater cultural
heritage must be developed by potential salvors and presented to the
relevant authorities for approval.' 60 Parties to the Convention have the
duty to ensure the reporting of discoveries and intended activities of
their nationals and flag vessels with respect to underwater cultural
155. K. Russell LaMotte, Introductory Note to UNESCO: Convention on the
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 41 I.L.M. 37, 38 (2002).
156. UNESCO Convention, supra note 153, art. 4.
157. Id., Annex, Rule 1.
158. See id art. 4. The requirements for the application of salvage or finds law are
that the salvage activity was "authorized by the competent authorities," "in full
conformity with the Convention," and ensures that any recovery [of the property]
achieves its maximum protection." Id. Groups performing what is ordinarily thought of
as salvage work are not likely to have a much luck obtaining authorization, because the
activity they will propose is motivated by their desire to profit from their discovery, see
id. art. 2 (stating that "[u]underwater cultural heritage shall not be commercially
exploited," and using other language suggesting that the Convention's protection of
underwater cultural heritage is stronR): id. Annex. Rule 2 (statin2 that "ft]he commercial
exploitation of underwater cultural heritage for trade or speculation or its irretrievable
dispersal is fundamentally incompatible with the protection and proper mana2ement of
underwater cultural heritaue. Underwater cultural heritage shall not be traded, sold,
bought or bartered as commercial goods"), and must also overcome the Convention's
preference for in situ preservation. Id. art. 2 & Annex Rule 1 (calling this "the first
option").
159. Id. Annex, Rule 2; see also id. art. 2. An Italian delegate involved in the
preparation of the Convention suggests that the heavy limitations were placed on salvage
in part based on the argument that underwater property is not in peril. Guido Carducci,
New Developments in the Law of the Sea: The UNESCO Convention on the Protection of
the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 96 AM J. INT'L. L. 419, 424 (2002).
160. UNESCO Convention, supra note 153, Annex, Rules 9, 10.
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heritage in the state's exclusive economic zone, on the continental shelf,
and on the high seas.' 6' The Convention has yet to be ratified by the
required number of parties, and is not currently in force. The United
States is not among the states that have ratified the Convention thus
far. 162  Nevertheless, the possibility of future entry into force of the
Convention, ratification and execution of the Convention into American
law, and the potential for the Convention to one day give rise to
customary international law obligations, 163 make the Convention a cause
for salvors' concern.
The consequences of the Convention are seemingly inescapable for
salvors, who until this time have been confronted only with laws of
limited geographical application. International waters had been largely
free of regulation, although until recently, large areas of these waters
were beyond the technological reach of salvors. Courts of admiralty in
the United States have traditionally exercised jurisdiction over salvage
cases arising in international waters, based on the theory that salvage is
part of the law of nations. 164 But if other nations adopt and apply the
Convention and the United States does not, their law of salvage will be
at odds with that which is applied in the United States. If salvage law
under the Convention comes to differ substantially from U.S. law, U.S.
courts may be drawn to reconsider their own understanding of the
substantive law of salvage, because it is at odds with the jus gentium as
modified by widespread application of the Convention
1 65
161. Id. art. 9, 11.
162. The treaty specifies that twenty states must become parties to the treaty before
it enters into force. Id. art. 27. As yet, the only states to ratify this relatively new treaty
are Panama, Bulgaria, Croatia, Spain, and Libya. See UNESCO.org, http://erc.unesco.
org/cp/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E (last visited Nov. 10, 2005).
163. Customary international law obligations arise when the states follow a practice
generally and consistently, and do so out of a sense of legal obligation. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102. Customary international law is incorporated
into the law of the United States, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), so if
courts find that customary obligations for the United States have arisen under it, they
will enforce them.
164. See, e.g., Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned
Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 567 (5th Cir. 1981).
165. See R.MS. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d at 967 ("[tlhe need for courts of
admiralty to apply the law similarly is fundamentally important to international
commerce and to the policies supporting order on the high seas. It is therefore prudent
for [a] court sitting in admiralty, to ensure enforcement in harmony with these shared
maritime principles"); The Epsilon, 8 F. Cas. 744, 746 (E.D.N.Y. 1873) (looking to the
law of "great maritime nations" for guidance, because "uniformity is almost the essence
of the maritime law"). Cf Warshauer v. Lloyd Sabaudo S.A., 71 F.2d 146, 147 (2nd Cir.
No matter where salvors operate, enactment of the Convention into
law would place obstacles in their path whenever they seek to recover
older property. This is particularly problematic in stretches of the oceans
which were inaccessible due to their depth and conditions until the
advent of modem salvage technology. In these areas, the Convention's
reporting and authorization requirements, 166 as well as the improbability of
obtaining a permit for salvage for the purpose of disposing of the
property in court and receiving an award or title,167 will likely thwart
salvors' efforts to recover shipwrecks that have remained inaccessible
for centuries. Modem deep sea salvage equipment will not be able to
recover this long-lost property, preventing the retrieval, study and
exhibition of the historical and cultural artifacts that the Convention
aims to protect.
The Convention will not only cause modem technology to go to
waste, but will also deprive society of the benefit of the items which
salvors are prevented from recovering. The Rule set forth in the Annex
describing the "project design" that must be submitted to gain approval
for "activities directed at underwater cultural heritage" does not
contemplate that the incentives for recovery operations will come from
the possibility of an award of money or title to property. 168 Instead, the
Annex is essentially a set of guidelines for responsible archaeology. It is
naive of the Convention's drafters to think that enough funding for
archaeological exploration will be forthcoming to allow for recovery of
property, even in those instances where the Convention's preference for
"in situ preservation" is rebutted.169 Archaeologists typically must wait
for a grant of funds to commence recovery activities, while salvors have
long been able to generate their own funding by bringing property before
a court. The Convention's apparent elimination of this traditional means of
funding will hinder whatever recovery efforts are permitted by "competent
authorities" under the Convention, by requiring that such efforts be
funded by whatever capital salvors can generate in the absence of court
awards. This will likely entail competition for the scarce monies available
for archaeological research, 170 because the Convention's foreclosure of
1934) ("a court should be slow to establish a new legal principle not in harmony with the
generally accepted views of the great maritime nations").
166. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 153, art. 9, 11, Annex Rules 9, 10.
167. Id. Annex, Rule 2 (specifying that the property to which the convention applies
is not to be "commercially exploited" or "traded, sold, bought, or bartered," presumably
enjoining salvage awards and sales of the property).
168. See id. Annex Part II, Rule 17.
169. See id. Annex, Rule 1 ("in situ preservation shall be considered as the first
option").
170. Bryant, supra note 88, at 110 (2001) (stating that "[t]he disparity in funding
between salvors and archaeologists is often stark").
202
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commercial exploitation of the recovery makes salvage operations a
poor investment from a business standpoint.
Like the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, the Convention would keep from
the reach of salvage and finds law a wider variety of property than is
necessary, given that the purpose of the Convention is to keep historic
sunken property underwater. Under the Convention, all sunken property
more than 100 years old is considered part of the "underwater cultural
heritage." No distinction is made between property of historical significance
and what is probably the much larger amount of property with little
historical significance. 171 An untold amount of old sunken property of
all sorts lies on the sea floor, and the mere fact that property sank more
than 100 years ago should not be assumed to confer historic value upon it.
1 72
Of course, the validity of the use of so-called "in situ preservation" as
a method of preservation can itself be called into question. Deterioration
of the underwater property suggests that "in situ preservation" is not
preservation at all. 173 Furthermore, the impossibility of giving to more
than a few members of the interested public the opportunity for interaction
with what is said to be their "heritage" suggests that supporters of "in
situ preservation" adhere to an exclusivist view of history, viewing it as
available only for the enjoyment of the privileged.
74
171. LaMotte, supra note 155, at 38.
172. Cf Meazell, supra note 110, at 1475 (noting that, while some wrecks are
treasure-laden or historic, the "vast majority" are neither).
173. Bryant, supra note 88, at 111-16; see also The Nuestra Senora de Atocha, 569
F.2d at 337 (noting that a sunken vessel, even after it has been discovered, "is still in
peril of being lost through the actions of the elements").
174. Bryant, supra note 88, at 114 (in situ preservation leaves historic shipwrecks
"accessible only by a few"). While access to underwater sites has improved, it cannot be
said that they are as accessible to the general public as are many historic sites on land.
Id at 114-15 (in situ preservation would "limit access to historic shipwrecks to recreational
divers, high-end tourist ventures, those capitalizing on wrecks via underwater movies
and video feeds, and ... archaeologists"). While there may be special reasons to leave
some otherwise-useful property lying idly at the bottom of the briny deep, see 16 U.S.C.
§ 450(rr)(b)(4) (2000) (site-specific preservation statute protecting the Titanic), the law
should be careful not to allow arguments for in situ preservation of particular sites to
become unduly elevated into sweeping justifications for depriving society of the
historical knowledge and economic value that can be derived from raising the property.
Cf RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE PORTABLE EMERSON 283 (Viking Press, 1974) (while
perhaps "[y]ou cannot overstate our debt to the past, has the present no claim?"). It is
worth noting the words of Emerson: "The world exists for the education of each man,"
and the "secret of education lies in respecting the pupil," as "it is not for you to choose what
he shall know .. " Id. at 142, 260.
The Convention would harm salvors, property owners, and society as
a whole, by preventing useful salvage activity where property is more
than 100 years old, and by putting far too much stock in "in situ
preservation." It would prevent the efficient return of otherwise wasted
resources into the economy, and wrest from property owners much of
their remaining interest in the sunken property after 100 years.175 The
Convention would keep historical artifacts out of the reach of both
historians and the public, 176 who cannot rely on either legally-limited
salvors or cash-strapped archaeologists to retrieve sunken items. 77 As a
result, promising modem salvage technologies would be rendered unable
to perform the previously impossible tasks for which they were designed.
Analysis of each of the measures discussed above indicates that the
important purposes served by salvage and finds law warrant the rejection
of each of the specific proposals employed so far by preservationists.
Their concern with salvage activities on sunken ships, particularly those
that have sunk recently and have little historical significance, often
appear to unjustifiably value minimal interests in preservation over the
recovery of large amounts of valuable property. By limiting the operation
of salvage law, preservationists' plans may in fact encourage salvors
currently trying to operate within the law to steal salvaged property.
Also, preservationists' imposition of restrictive rules forbidding or
deterring the salvage of historical items prevents the very people of
whose "heritage" these "underwater cultural" resources form a part-the
public as a whole-from having contact with or gaining more knowledge
about that heritage.
The preservationists' initiatives reflect an unwillingness to compromise,
promoting preservation uber alles without regard to the wasteful and
self-defeating results of that approach. However, it would be wrong to
infer from flaws in the preservationists' approach or their specific
175. As the states parties are charged with enforcing the provisions, enforcement of
the Convention's prohibition on the recovery of the sunken property by the U.S.
government would likely raise issues under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
See ERWIN CHERMERINSKY, CONsTITuTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 512 (1997)
(noting that "government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically
viable use of property").
176. For this reason, it seems odd that the term "heritage" was used by the
Convention's drafters to describe the sunken matter to be preserved. The word descends
from French and ultimately from Latin words for "heir," and is defined as "property that
descends from an heir," something.., acquired from a predecessor: legacy, inheritance,"
"tradition," or "birthright." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 543 (10th ed.
1999) (defining heritage); see also id. at 1251 (defining "tradition" in terms of"inherit[ance]"
or "a handing down"). The Convention's drafters, who described as "heritage" the very sunken
items which the Convention aims to keep underwater "in situ," ignore the term's
proprietary and possessory undertones.
177. Bryant, supranote 88, at 111-13.
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proposals that the underlying goal of preservation should never be
permitted to constrain salvors' behavior. Salvors of sunken property do
sometimes engage in practices that cause damage to artifacts and the
environment. 78 If courts and legislatures are to deal with this problem
sensibly, they should craft rules with a view toward allowing the
realization of as many benefits of both salvage and preservation as
possible. This approach dictates that absolute rules permitting or preventing
salvage should not be adopted. Instead, salvage and finds law should
continue to apply, but a measure of protection for history and the
environment must be devised. Any limitations should not function as a
barrier to all salvage, but should instead operate as a filter designed to
eliminate those activities of salvors that are most antithetical to the
legitimate concerns of preservationists.
Two noteworthy legal alternatives to the legal regimes discussed
above secure the greatest possible preservation without having the same
deleterious effects on salvage activity. One of them has already been
employed, at least in part, in salvage cases. 79 It involves adding a
seventh factor to the existing formula for calculating salvage awards.
1 80
Long-standing precedent holds that the six "main ingredients" to be
taken into account by a judge fashioning a salvage award are: (1) the
labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service; (2) the
"promptitude, skill, and energy" shown by the salvors; (3) the value of
the salvors' equipment used in the salvage operation and the risks to
which it was exposed; (4) the risk run by the salvors in conducting the
operation; (5) the value of the property saved; and (6) the degree of
danger from which it was saved.?81 The Blackwall factors focus on the
property that is the subject of the salvage effort, the economic value of
that property, and the salvors themselves. None of them consider the
impact the salvage effort has on the environment or on the quality of
178. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 977 F. Supp 1193, 1196-98 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
(example of environmentally unsound procedures); Craft, 6 O.R.W. at 150-52, 181
(facts of case involve risk to historic items, with divers seeking to recover the sunken
artifacts by means of "booty bags" and in haste so as not to be caught); Carducci, supra
note 159, at 421 (noting that advancing salvage technology has placed historically-
significant sunken property within reach of persons "not necessarily keen on its
preservation or schooled in methods for achieving it").
179. See, e.g., Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450,
468 (4th Cir. 1992) (suggesting a seventh factor, considering protection of historical and
archaeological value).
180. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 13-14.
181. Id.
sunken historical and cultural items. 182  The continued use of these
factors in calculating salvage awards indicate that they have done well at
performing the function assigned them. However, concerns about historical
and environmental impacts caused by salvors of sunken property, and
repeated legislative action placing obstacles in the path of salvors that
has resulted from those concerns, suggest that salvage law may need
some fine-tuning so that it may continue to reflect a societal consensus.
Legitimate concerns over historical and environmental impacts should
be addressed, and the flexible Blackwall test seems well-suited to the
task of accommodating these modem interests.'83
The solution is to add another factor: "the degree to which the salvors
have worked to protect [both] the historical and archaeological value of
the wreck and items salved"'18 and the quality of the surrounding marine
environment. Some cases already call for consideration of salvors'
protection of the historical and archaeological value of the items in cases
of "ancient shipwrecks.' ' 185 However, authority supporting application of
a factor concerned with the efforts of salvors at environmental preservation
remains very weak, 186 even though the United States is party to a treaty
182. To the extent that the salvage effort negatively affects the historical and
cultural qualities of the item salvaged, and this has an impact on the economic value of
the item, both the law of salvage and the law of finds already give the salvor an incentive
to act responsibly to minimize such harm. Any carelessness will tend to reduce the value
of the property, and thus, the amount of the potential award, see id. 13-14, or the value
of title to the property, or may result in an offsetting or forfeiture of the award upon a
finding of negligence. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 554.
183. See The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 13-14. The factors are, after all, only the "main
ingredients" to be considered, not the exclusive ingredients. Id.
184. Columbus-Am. Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 468. For more on the content of
this duty, see Bryant, supra note 88, at 138.
185. Id.; see also Cobb Coin Co. Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 2108 (D.C. Fla. 1981).
186. The Eastern District of Louisiana has indicated that salvors' protection of the
environment may be considered as an independent factor in calculating the salvage
award. Trico Marine Operators, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 809 F. Supp. 440, 443 (E.D.
La. 1992). However, in a later case, the Fifth Circuit cast doubt on the Trico Marine
Operators court's addition of the environmental factor. Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at
988-89 (noting Trico Marine's additional factor, and stating that the "additional factor [of]
general protection of the environment by salvors... has never been endorsed by this
court"). Other courts citing Trico Marine have either noted its suggestion of a seventh
factor in dicta, Fine v. Rockwood, 895 F. Supp. 306, 310 (S.D. Fl. 1995) (predating
Margate Shipping Co.), cited its new approach and applied it but then expressly
disclaimed reliance on it, New Bedford Marine Reserve, Inc. v. Cape Jewelers, Inc., 240
F. Supp. 2d 101, 118-19 (D. Mass. 2003) (stating that salvors' award was unaffected by
consideration of this factor), or treated it as authority for the different and less
controversial proposition that potential "liability for environmental damage" under other
law may be considered as one of the risks run by salvors in conducting the salvage
operation. United States v. Ex-USS Cabot/Dedalo, 179 F. Supp.2d 697, 711 n.33 (S.D.
Tex. 2000).
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calling for application of such a factor.
18 7
The regular inclusion of the proposed two-part factor in calculation of
the award would not give rise to anomalous results. The factor can be
employed in all cases where sunken property is salvaged, regardless of
its historical value or the quality of the surrounding environment,
because the very nature of the factor-based approach to determining a
salvage award allows for factors to receive different weight in different
cases. 188 The weight assigned by the court will be affected by the property's
actual historical value and by the environmental quality of its surroundings.
When sunken property has little or no historical or archaeological
significance, and when the salvage operation occurs where the environment is
already in poor condition, salvors' harm to historical or environmental
interests should be given less weight.
187. See International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 28, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 193,
available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/IJNEP/salvageEnglish.pdf (last visited Nov.
10, 2005). Article 13 of the treaty sets forth a modified regime for calculating salvage
awards, which includes a factor specifically addressed to the salvors' preservation of the
environment. Id. art. 13. The Trico Marine court placed reliance on the International
Convention on Salvage, signed in London, Apr. 28, 1989, which entered into force with
the ratification of the United States in 1992. See id. However, "U.S. courts usually
decide salvage controversies under the principles of the general maritime law without
reference to international conventions," see ROBERT FORCE, ADMIRALTY AND MARITrIME
LAW, ch. 8, § 153 (available on Westlaw, at Admmarlaw 153), or even in contravention
of them. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 988-89 (indicating the Fifth Circuit has
never approved the use of an environmental factor, despite existence of treaty suggesting
an environmental factor is required). Concerns about judicial authority, which are often
implicated when courts give short shrift to valid legislative and executive judgments, do
not apply because of the unique situation of admiralty law in the constitutional context.
See R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d at 960-63 (discussing the place of admiralty
law in the constitutional scheme, and noting that a case in admiralty is not considered to
"arise under the constitution or laws of the United States" because of admiralty's pre-
constitutional origins). Thus, the 1989 Convention has had little, if any, impact on the
calculation of salvage awards, as the paucity of cases relying on its factors and the
abundance of cases adhering to the suggests. See, e.g., Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at
983, 984, 986 (referring to the Blackwall factors as "venerable factors" and noting that
they are the ones traditionally applied by district courts, while declining to mention the
1989 Convention and casting doubt on Trico Marine); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked
and Abandoned Vessel, 286 F.3d at 204 (without mention of the 1989 Convention,
stating that "[in determining the appropriate award, courts generally rely on the six
factors set out in The Blackwall .. "); Offshore Marine Towing, Inc. v. MR23, 412 F.3d
1254, 1257 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (in setting forth a "guide" for determining salvage award,
reciting the Blackwall factors while making no mention of the 1989 Salvage Convention
or its added environmental factor).
188. The application of the factors is a matter for the district court's discretion, and
receives considerable deference on appeal. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 983-84.
The addition of this seventh factor will give salvors a strong incentive
to avoid the harms that have caused so much consternation among
preservationists. Without depriving salvors of the chance to recover a
fair reward for their troubles, the addition of the seventh factor can
effectively punish salvage methods that give short shrift to historical and
environmental preservation. The first salvors who fail to pay heed to the
new seventh factor may have to be made an example for their peers, but
the reduction of their awards will send a strong message: avoid harm to
historical artifacts and the environment, or lose money.' 89 On the other
hand, where salvors do especially meritorious work from the standpoint
of preservation, demonstrating exceptional skill in avoiding historical
and environmental harm, courts may increase the award. 190 Such an
application of the seventh factor would make preservation an important
objective for salvors rather than an obstacle in their path.
Just as salvors will do what is necessary to avoid losing their awards,
the owners of the recovered property have good reason to argue for
application of the seventh factor to reduce the award. The owner's
incentive arises when the seventh factor is applied, because less of the
value of the recovered property will have to be paid to a salvor whose
acts trigger the application of that factor to reduce the award. Because
the salvor is likely to be in the best position to present evidence on the
environmental and historical quality of the salvage site before and after
the salvage effort, the salvor should bear the burden of producing
evidence pertaining to the conformity of his action with the dictates of
the seventh factor. Enforcement of preservation requirements would
thus be ensured without destroying the structure of incentives that gives
salvors reason to engage in their useful occupation.
Of course, applying the seventh factor can only be effective where
salvage law is applied. Where the law of finds is applied, the size of the
award is not contested, because the award is title to the property. 19'
Salvors can avoid their seventh-factor duty under salvage law by arguing
189. Courts have desired to send this message in the past without explicitly
applying a seventh factor. See Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 208 (D.C. Fla. 1981). It is consistent with
the message sent by courts in other contexts to deter misconduct by salvors. See, e.g.,
The Barque Island City, 66 U.S. at 130 (any "plunder" or "embezzlement" by salvors
"works a forfeiture" of their claim); Nolan v. A.H. Basse Rederi Aktieselskab, 164 F.
Supp. 774, 777 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (noting that this rule of forfeiture of salvage claims for
"plundering" may be applied as against all salvors of an item of imperiled property when
only a few commit misconduct if the misconduct was open enough so that salvors not
actually engaged in wrongdoing "could be charged with responsibility for permitting,
concealing or failing to report it").
190. See Columbus-Am. Discovery, 974 F.2d at 468.
191. Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and
Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987).
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for the application of finds law. Moreover, even under salvage law
supplemented by the seventh factor, salvors would face no greater a
sanction than the reduction of their award. While the loss of award may
be substantial, it may not go far enough when a salvor has behaved in an
egregiously destructive manner. Therefore, another legal mechanism
may be needed to ensure preservation without bringing an end to the
salvage of sunken property.
Such a mechanism could be legislatively created by combining
relevant aspects of the law of salvage with enforcement tools known in
other areas of the law. For example, the right to sue salvors for negligent,
reckless, or intentional harm to historically significant or environmentally
sound salvage sites could be conferred by statute on both the
government and other interested parties. Rather than a traditional award
of damages for negligence, however, the remedy for the salvor's
negligent harm to the historical or environmental quality of the site and
property would be in the nature of a penalty sufficient to deter similar
conduct in the future. The penalty would be payable to the government,
regardless of the identity of the party that brought the suit. Finally, the
new statute should also provide salvors with a cause of action for
damages for frivolous suits brought under the new negligence cause of
action.
Creating such a cause of action would employ existing legal concepts
in a different factual setting. Liability for salvors already exists where
their negligence results in damage to the property salvaged.19 2  The
standard of care is one of "good faith and reasonable judgment and
skill,"'193 and can be applied to both the salvor's activities during the
operation and the salvor's disposition of the property after it is removed
192. See, e.g., Basic Boats, Inc. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 44, 48 (E.D. Va.
1972).
193. Dorrington v. City of Detroit, 223 F. 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1915), (citing The
Laura, 81 U.S. 336, 344 (1871). Courts require a showing of gross negligence when
liability is sought to be imposed solely on the basis of the ineffectiveness of the salvage
efforts. See, e.g., Dorrington, 223 F. 232, at 241 (requiring "clear evidence of culpable
negligence or willful misconduct"), but "[c]onversely there will be no award made because
the operation was unsuccessful." Basic Boats, 352 F. Supp. at 48. In some courts, if a
salvor's activities cause the salvaged property to "suffer[] some distinguishable
injury... other than that which would have been suffered had not salvage efforts been
undertaken," ordinary negligence is the standard. Id. But other courts have required a
showing of gross negligence as a general matter. P. Dougherty Co. v. United States, 207
F.2d 626, 636 (3rd Cir. 1953). Damages, when assessed, need not be limited to a set-off
against the salvage award, but may exceed it and constitute an affirmative award.
Dorrington, 23 F. 232, at 240.
209
from peril. 194  At present, however, salvors' duties to owners of the
salvaged property do not include a duty to avoid negligent harm to
environmental or historical interests that do not impact the value of the
salvaged property. The idea of creating a cause of action to remedy
harms recognized by statute and allowing interested parties to sue to
enforce the statute is not new.
195
Perhaps the only novel aspect of the proposed statutory scheme is the
idea that damages will be paid into government coffers regardless of who
sues. This provision is sensible for three reasons. First, it will prevent
opportunistic third parties from suing to enrich themselves. Allowing
claimants other than the government to retain the proceeds of their
victory, beyond perhaps attorney fees, would be an unjust outcome in
light of the lack of harm actually done to them and would not further the
policy goals of the proposed legislation. Second, by limiting the
incentive of private parties to sue to further their interest in ensuring that
historical and environmental harms are deterred, the provision is
designed to encourage these parties to ascertain before suing whether,
and to what extent a salvage operation has actually caused such harm.
196
Along with the provision allowing damages for frivolous suits, the fact
that the penalty will be paid to the government will encourage potential
claimants to limit their claims to those regarding salvage sites and
operations in which historical and environmental values are actually
implicated. A third reason for the government to collect the penalty can be
discerned from the nature of the harms the statute aims to deter. The
impact of harm to history and the environment is not felt merely by a
few individuals but by public at large, so the proposed legislation would
recognize the public's interest by turning penalties assessed over to the
government. 197
194. The Henry Steers, 110 F. 578, 582-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1901) (noting that actionable
negligence can arise both before and after the time at which the property is saved from
peril, and indicating that a court should be reluctant to find negligence in the former
situation). See also Serviss v. Ferguson, 84 F. 202, 203 (2nd C.C.A. 1897) (affirming
imposition of damages for negligent harm to salvaged property caused while the property
was in the salvor's care).
195. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)
(describing action of private persons as "private attorneys general" as the mechanism for
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
196. In any event, the claimants would have to establish standing to prosecute the
action. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09
(2004) (setting forth the rules that comprise "standing jurisprudence['s] two strands:
Article III standing. . . and prudential standing").
197. See Cobb Coin Co. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 525 F. Supp. 186, 218 (D.C. Fla. 1981) (recognizing as valid state's valid interest
in preservation of artifacts in question).
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The proposed statute would not provide for strict liability, because the
object of the statute is not to discourage salvage generally, but only to
penalize those salvors who undermine historical and environmental
preservation. Strict tort liability, which imposes liability on a defendant
regardless of fault, has been employed instead of a negligence standard
where an activity is such that, "while it will be tolerated by the law, [it]
must pay its way."'198 Salvage activity cannot be said to fit this description.
Rather than being merely tolerated, salvage has long been positively
encouraged by the law.199 Rather than posing "unduly great" dangers,
20 0
salvage has been perceived as conferring remarkable benefits on society that
would not be realized without the existence of incentives to encourage
salvors. Strict liability for historical and environmental harms would burden
salvors with liability even for harms caused by accidents that may occur
in their work. Its application would therefore result in the anomaly that
salvors will be held to a higher standard of care for historical and
environmental preservation than the duty of ordinary care and reasonable
diligence they currently owe to owners of the salvaged property.
Critics of both of the proposals described above will point out that
there is no provision made for the total prevention of salvage of any
sunken property. Unlike any of the schemes described above, these two
proposals do not aim to take away incentives for acts of salvage or to
forbid it altogether. Absolute preservationists will, no doubt, chafe at the
notion that their brand of protection is not, at a minimum, extended to
some sunken property. Preservationists might argue that the historical
and environmental interests as to some property are so great that the
protection offered by the two proposals is simply not sufficient. There is
no need to respond to such criticisms by showing that there are never
situations where absolute, in situ preservation is warranted. Instead, it is
enough to say that situations in which such preservation is necessary
ought to be identified by Congress on a case-by-case basis, rather than
addressed by a general law, the applicability of which is not clearly
linked to the actual historical or environmental value of a particular
piece of sunken property. A site-specific law of this kind is currently in
198. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at
536 (5th ed. 1984).
199. See, e.g., Blaireau, 6 U.S. at 266-77.
200. KEETON, supra note 198, at 536.
force to prevent salvage activity on the site of the Titanic.20 1 Absolute
preservation of sunken property on the sea floor, without allowing for any
prospect of recovery, is a drastic measure, forever removing those items
from the possession of the property owner and preventing the items'
economically valuable use. Therefore, the decision to employ such
absolute preservation should be treated as a significant one that should
be made by reference to the particular property to be preserved, rather
than through general laws like the Abandoned Shipwreck Act and the
UNESCO Convention. These laws may bar the recovery of sunken
property that has no historical value and can be salvaged with minimal
impact on the environment. At the same time, the laws are inapplicable
to a considerable amount of property that does warrant protection.
Replacing the existing laws and preservationist proposals with one or
both of the changes suggested above would bring about enhanced
preservation without eliminating the salvage of sunken property or
causing substantial declines in salvage activity. Technological changes
have improved salvors' ability to salvage responsibly, making it possible
to impose duties with respect to historical and environmental preservation
that would have been unthinkable in the past.. Furthermore, new laws
would be sure to drive the development of salvage technology, as salvors
would demand tools which would allow them to comply more easily
with the law. These useful developments are less likely to occur if-as
is contemplated by the more drastic measures promoted by
preservationists-the incentives created by traditional salvage and finds
law are eliminated, or the scope of the property to which any remaining
incentives apply is minimized.
Additionally, these proposals allow for the historical value and
environmental condition of individual sites of salvage to be appraised by
courts on the basis of a more relevant and complete factual record than is
available to legislatures when they enact blanket statutory prohibitions
of and disincentives to salvage. Courts assessing whether to adjust
salvage awards or grant damages under the proposed rules will require
evidence of the historical and environmental qualities of wreckage in
order to make their determinations. Penalties or restrictions will be
applied only where it is shown that they are needed, and can be tailored
in their severity by the court to fit the situation. Limitations on salvage
that are responsive to the facts of a given case allow property owners,
salvors, and society as a whole to continue to realize the benefits of
salvage, while at the same time requiring changes in the practices of
salvors where these offend against protected interests in preservation.
201. See 16 U.S.C. § 450(rr)(b)(4) (2000). Other parts of this act call for an international
agreement to protect the Titanic. 16 U.S.C. § 450(rr)-(4).
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By comparison, judicial and legislative preservation schemes proposed by
preservationists and utilized thus far do not allow for the same
differentiation of outcomes in their application. Those schemes do not give
salvors an incentive to preserve historical artifacts and the environment
to the extent that those interests are implicated. Instead, salvors are
forbidden from doing their work altogether, or are deprived of the
incentives that have long impelled their actions. Preservationist schemes
are applied based on criteria that are largely irrelevant to determining the
extent to which historical or environmental concerns are implicated by a
given salvage effort. As a result, their operation will discourage even
those salvors who do no harm to these important interests-an outcome
that should suit no one other than those most implacably opposed to the
application of salvage and finds law.
In conclusion, the protection of history and the environment does not
require the discouragement of the useful practice of salvage. The heavy-
handed solutions proposed or implemented so far will likely prevent a
great deal of salvage activity. This result is harmful to the interests of
owners of sunken property, salvors, and society as a whole. Owners of
sunken property want to recover as much of its value as possible, a result
which requires for its achievement the recovery of some or all of the
property. This outcome benefits society as a whole by placing the
recovered items back into the economy.2 °2 Salvors rely on legal incentives
to entice them to recover property, however, so restrictions that eliminate
or drastically reduce those incentives (like those backed thus far by
preservationists) forfeit the advantages produced by application of
traditional salvage and finds law. Rather than impose such restrictions,
society ought to protect legitimate historical and environmental interests
by using approaches that generally allow salvors to continue to perform
their useful work. By employing the proposed seventh factor for
calculating salvage awards and by adopting the suggested new cause of
action, courts and Congress can see to it that history and the environment
are preserved, while at the same time "encourag[ing] the hardy and
adventurous mariner to engage in these laborious and sometimes
dangerous enterprises. '2 ° a
202. See Margate Shipping, 143 F.3d at 986 ("the law of salvage seeks to preserve
society's resources").
203. The Blackwall, 77 U.S. at 14.
214
